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Abstract
The concept of shared value was introduced by Porter and Kramer
as a new conception of capitalism. Shared value describes the strategy
of organizations that simultaneously enhance their competitiveness and
the social conditions of related stakeholders such as employees, suppliers
and the natural environment. The idea has generated strong interest, but
also some controversy due to a lack of a precise definition, measurement
techniques and difficulties to connect theory to practice. We overcome
these drawbacks by proposing an economic framework based on three key
aspects: coalition formation, sustainability and consistency, meaning that
conclusions can be tested by means of logical deductions and empirical
applications. The presence of multiple agents to create shared value and
the optimization of both social and economic criteria in decision making
represent the core of our quantitative definition of shared value. We also
show how economic models can be characterized as shared value models
by means of logical deductions. Summarizing, our proposal builds on the
foundations of shared value to improve its understanding and to facilitate
the suggestion of economic hypotheses, hence accommodating the concept
of shared value within modern economic theory.
Keywords: quantitative economics; cooperative games; multiple criteria
decision making; society and environment.
JEL Codes: D21, C71.
1 Introduction
Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer proposed the concept of shared value
(SV) to clearly identify policies that an organization implements to simulta-
neously increase its competitiveness and enhance the social conditions of the
communities in which they operate (Porter and Kramer, 2011). The authors
used the concept of SV for the first time in Porter and Kramer (2006) although
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it was fully developed later in Porter and Kramer (2011). The underlying hy-
pothesis is simple: focusing on both the economic and social aspects of the
activities developed by organizations will benefit them in the long term. Here,
social should be understood in broad sense including environmental issues.
The idea of SV has received the attention of the management and economics
research community. However, SV has also created some controversia. Crane
et al. (2014) acknowledge the increasing popularity of the term but they also
state that the concept of SV suffers from some serious shortcomings. Among
others, the authors pointed out lack of originality, ignorance of the tensions
between social and economic goals, and a naive conception of business compli-
ance. Porter and Kramer (2014) responded to these criticisms by claiming that
other authors such as Elkington (1994) and Emerson (2003) made important
contributions to this area of research even though they focused on different as-
pects. Porter and Kramer further claimed that SV has gained so much traction
because it aligns social progress with corporate self-interest in a concrete and
highly tangible way.
A recent literature review by Dembek et al. (2016) attempted to answer the
question: is shared value a theoretical concept or a buzzword? The authors
concluded that, beyond the strong interest generated, SV conceptualization is
vague, and it presents important discrepancies in the way it is defined and
operationalized. It also overlaps with many other related concepts. By reviewing
how SV was defined in the literature and what empirical instances were used
to illustrate the concept, Dembek et al. (2016) identified several key areas to
develop the concept of SV from a theoretical perspective. Next, we transform
these key areas in three main research questions:
• RQ1: Who should benefit from SV?
• RQ2: How can we measure the outcomes of SV?
• RQ3: How can we manage conflicts between social and economic goals?
In order to address the previous research questions, we follow a theoretical
and quantitative approach in a similar way to recent approaches to the related
concept of circular economy (Korhonen et al., 2018; Garc´ıa-Barraga´n et al.,
2019). Concepts, meanings and examples related to SV have been thoroughly
discussed (Porter and Kramer, 2006, 2011; Aakhus and Bzdak, 2012; Crane
et al., 2014; Dembek et al., 2016). However, there is a need for an abstract
architecture and a quantitative approach that enable researchers to guide the
discussion and enrich further works on the topic. Even though SV is mainly
an economic concept, current research do not approach SV from a quantitative
perspective. The techniques to measure the benefits (economical and societal)
that derive from SV policies are still missing.
As a result, we here introduce and develop shared value economics (SVE).
We provide a theoretical framework for SVE by integrating three distinct but
complementary theories: (1) multiagent systems; (2) utility theory; and (3)
multiple criteria decision making. Conveniently, we use multiagent systems
to address RQ1, we rely on utility theory to answer RQ2, and we propose
multiple criteria decision making to solve RQ3. Once we characterize shared
value economics by means of an axiomatic approach, we address an additional
interesting research question:
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• RQ4. Given an economic model, can we classify it as a SVE model or as
as non-SVE model?
Summarizing, our theoretical framework builds on concept of shared value
to improve its understanding and to facilitate the suggestion of economic hy-
potheses. This framework guides companies and external analysts in the study
of shared value economics by providing the quantitative foundations of shared
value economics. Our axiomatic approach allows to develop formal reasoning
within the field of shared value economics. We describe such a formal reason-
ing by addressing the important question of characterizing existing economic
models as shared value models by means of logical deductions. Finally, our pro-
posal represents a tool to estimate the impact of different shared value policies
in economic terms, hence accommodating the concept within modern economic
theory.
In Section 2, we propose an axiomatic approach to the concept of shared
value. Next, in Section 3, we develop the quantitative foundations of shared
value economics. In Section 4, we illustrate how can we classify an economic
model within the field of shared value economics. Finally, Section 5 concludes
and provides natural extensions of our work.
2 An axiomatic approach to share value
This section develops the concept of SV following an axiomatic approach. Shared
value was defined by Porter and Kramer (2011) as follows.
Definition 1 (Shared value). Policies and operating practices that enhance
the competitiveness of a company while simultaneously advancing the economic
and social conditions in the communities in which operates.
Next, we make a critical assumption.
Main assumption. Shared value can be measured.
Since our axiomatic approach is intended to quantitatively develop the con-
cept of SV, the previous assumption is a basic requirement. To this end, we
rely on utility functions as a numerical representation of preference and satis-
faction of agents within an economic context. From the main assumption, we
next consider the following axioms or premises.
Axiom 1 Coalition formation. Shared value results from a coalition.
Handling interactions between multiple SV agents will usually require some
degree of collaboration to achieve their respective goals. As a result, the forma-
tion of coalitions represents a fundamental requirement for SV. The rationale
for such a statement is that collaboration is a necessary step to establish poli-
cies that ultimately lead to joint performance improvement. For instance, in
a supply chain scenario, companies interested in reducing the environmental
impact of production processes by replacing virgin raw materials with recycled
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materials are forced to collaborate with current or new suppliers (Carter and
Rogers, 2008). In ridesharing, users collaborate with other users through social
networks in order to minimize travel costs and reduce pollution (Agatz et al.,
2012; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2018).
Coalition formation aims to determine how much collective shared value
can be obtained by forming a coalition (Shehory and Kraus, 1995; Sandholm
et al., 1999; Cerquides et al., 2013; Bistaffa et al., 2017). Formally, given a
finite set of agents A : {a1, a2, . . . , an}, a coalition is a subset S ⊆ A of agents.
We can evaluate each coalition S ∈ 2A by means of a characteristic function
v : 2A → R, that maps each coalition to its value. Then, a coalition structure
(CS) is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint coalitions and the value of
a CS is assessed through the sum of the values of its coalitions (Bistaffa et al.,
2017):
V (CS) =
∑
S∈CS
v(S). (1)
We here do not consider coalitions of size 1, also called singletons, in order
to respect the essence of Definition 1. However, the set of all possible coalitions
excluding singletons is 2|A| − |A| − 1. One way to address this issue is to
impose restrictions on coalition formation by means of graph theory (Myerson,
1977; Demange, 2004; Voice et al., 2012). In this setting, an undirected graph
G = (A,L), is a set A of nodes representing agents and a set L ⊆ A × A of
links or edges establishing the relationships between the agents. As a result,
links enable only connected agents to form a feasible coalition if its members
represent the nodes of a connected subgraph of G induced by S, i.e., for each
pair of agents ai and aj belonging to S, there is a path in G that connects ai
and aj (Bistaffa et al., 2017).
As an illustrative example, consider the main stakeholders of a company
and its relationships as shown in Figure 1. A feasible coalition can be estab-
lished between the company and its customers, between the company and its
employees, but cannot be established between its customers and its employees.
Considering now the company’s supply chain, a coalition can be established be-
tween suppliers S1, S3, S4 and S5, but cannot be established between suppliers
S2 and S5 because there is no link connecting suppliers S2 and S5.
In the context of SVE, we assimilate coalition value calculation to SV assess-
ment. Thus, we are interested in obtaining the most valuable coalition structure
between intelligent agents. However, this evaluation cannot be only expressed
in terms of economic criteria. If we want to adhere to what is stated in Defini-
tion 1, we need a second axiom.
Axiom 2 Sustainability. Shared value coalitions are sustainable.
At the core of the concept of SV, there is a need to consider not only the
economic but also the social aspects of corporate policies. The term social is
used by Porter and Kramer (2011) with a broad meaning that also includes en-
vironmental issues. From Definition 1, we infer that economic and social criteria
must be considered to make decisions in SVE. As a result, a second important
feature of SVE is that it deals with problems located at the intersection of eco-
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Figure 1: A graph representing a company (Co) and its links to stakeholders
such as customers(Cus), employees(Emp), suppliers (S1 to S5), and the natural
environment (Env).
nomic and social aspects. Thus, economic and social performance are the key
criteria to elicit the best solutions as shown in Figure 2.
Generally accepted accounting principles are used to refer to the standards
and procedures that companies should follow to elaborate their financial state-
ments. Similarly, there is a need to determine what policies generally constitute
shared value. To solve this problem, we here propose the concept of sustainabil-
ity. The intersection of economic and social (including environmental) aspects
is usually coined as sustainability (see e.g. Carter and Rogers (2008)). Then,
a hypothetical project evaluated in terms of expected profits but also in terms
of gender equality is, in essence, evaluated in terms of sustainability. More-
over, a new production process evaluated in terms of costs, workers safety and
environmental impact is indeed evaluated in terms of sustainability. The idea
that sustainability consists of three components (economics, society and the
natural environment) was developed by Elkington (1994, 1998, 2004). We here
adapt this idea to develop a framework for SVE in which economic and social
(including environmental) criteria are simultaneously considered, as stated in
Definition 1 and shown in Figure 2. In the context of SVE, we assume that
sustainability is the combination of at least two criteria, one economic and one
social, but maybe many others. As a result, we introduce the concept of sus-
tainable coalition.
Definition 2 (Sustainable coalition). Given a set of agents A, a coalition
S ∈ 2A is said to be sustainable when its characteristic function v : 2A → R is
of the form:
v(S) = g(ue, us) (2)
where ue ∈ U denotes an economic utility function and us ∈ U denotes a social
utility function.
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The characterization of a utility function as sustainable may be problematic
since we are trying to derive a mathematical expression from a multifaceted
concept. Remarkable efforts have been made (Sachs, 2012; Griggs et al., 2013;
United Nations, 2014) to propose a set of goals that considers economic, social
and environmental dimensions to improve people’s lives and protect the planet
for future generations. In the context of SVE, we propose the definition of
a sustainable utility function as the combination of economic and social utility
functions within a coalition. The rationale behind this proposal is twofold: first,
SV is an economic and social concept; and second, the use of utility functions in
economics and sociology is a well established field of research. In SVE, however,
we restrict the domain of social utility functions to those that directly affect
the economic and social conditions of an organization and its stakeholders (see
Definition 1).
Figure 2: A graphical definition of sustainability.
To illustrate Definition 2, we rely on the following examples. Indeed, this
definition implies the presence of at least one economic utility function (we
are dealing with economics) and at least one social utility function (we are
dealing with shared value). Porter and Kramer (2011) refer to food companies
refocusing from better taste and quantity to increase consumption to better
nutrition. Here consumption is the economic utility function for the organization
and nutrition is the social utility function for customers. The authors also report
distribution companies redesigning packaging and rerouting tracks to reduce
environmental impact. In this case, the sum of packaging and routing costs is
the economic utility function and the environmental impact is the social utility
function.
Axioms 1 and 2 characterize SVE by establishing its dimension and scope.
However, a method to elicit the best solutions in terms of SV is still missing.
What happens when economic, social and environmental criteria are in conflict?
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We need to look for a compromise solution from a SV perspective. We need a
method to make decisions. The following axiom characterizes the way in which
SV agents make decisions from a rational perspective.
Axiom 3 Consistency. Shared value is both internally and externally consis-
tent.
As any economic paradigm, the theory of SV aims to achieve both internal
and external consistency. Following Popper (1959), internal consistency means
that statements and conclusions of a theory are drawn by means of logical
deduction. In addition, external consistency means that the conclusions derived
from it can be tested by means of empirical applications. In other words, that the
theory should be useful both in theory and in practice. The internal consistency
of the theory of SV is shown by Porter and Kramer (2011). In this paper, we
extend the consistency of the theory of shared value in its external side. To
this end, we rely on multiple criteria decision making (MCDM) as a way to
ensure external consistency. The reasons to follow this way of action are the
next: 1) SV decisions requires a balance between multiple agents and multiple
objectives; 2) SV agents within a complex environment may face problems with
imperfect information. MCDM provides sound methods to deal with these two
issues as we next further elaborate.
Even though best solutions in economics have been traditionally determined
by single objective optimization, decision making with multiple criteria is the
rule rather than the exception in many research areas including economics (Ze-
leny, 1982; Yu, 1985; Romero, 1991; Ballestero and Romero, 1998; Branke et al.,
2008; Zopounidis and Doumpos, 2016). SVE is not one of these exceptions since
we are considering economic and social criteria to make decisions. Then, MCDM
becomes a necessary and useful tool.
MCDM dates back to Benjamin Franklin, when he suggested to divide a
sheet of paper by a line into two columns, writing pros on one column and cons
on the other one (MacCrimmon, 1973). The decision rule is simple: the column
with more points shows the way to act. From the great variety of MCDM tech-
niques, we here focus on those that accommodate well to SVE. To this end, we
propose a third condition for SV agents, namely, they are rational in the sense
that they aim to maximize their utility whatever it may be. The method used
to combine agent’s utility by means of a coalition becomes a critical point in our
approach to SVE. The decisions made by individual agents may have a different
impact in the optimization of the coalition value due to the presence of bargain-
ing power. For instance, in the possible coalition between a big corporation and
its workers, the bargaining power is on the organization side. On the contrary,
in the possible coalition between the same corporation and the government, the
bargaining power is on the stakeholder side due the government’s capability of
law enforcement. However, it is important to highlight that in this paper we
take the perspective of an external analyst to study SVE.
The notion of utility was formally developed by Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern (1953) to describe individual preferences when making decisions. The in-
herent complexity associated to multiple agents with multiple preferences results
in the use of well-defined utility functions as a sound surrogate for individual
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and global preferences. For instance, profit maximization is used as a surrogate
for utility optimization of the owners since they are entitled to a share of profits
(Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In our context, we use functions that ultimately de-
pends on possible states for each agent as a surrogate for utility. In Definition
2, we expressed the value of a sustainable coalition between agents as a function
v = g(ue, us) including, at least, an economic criteria ue and a social criteria us,
but maybe many others. Now, we go one step further by requiring agents to be
rational in the sense that they look for solutions that maximize their individual
utility. In order to propose the right MCDM technique to analyze SVE under
Axioms 1, 2 and 3, we consider two plausible scenarios.
Scenario 1. SV agents do not have specific targets for their utility functions.
A common approach to economics is utility optimization under a given set
of constraints. Rational agents aim to maximize their utility functions without
setting any specific target. The logic is simple: the higher utility, the better.
When considering two (or more) conflicting goals, the well-known concept of
Pareto efficiency provides the combination of achievement such that one goal
cannot be improved without decreasing the achievement of the second one. In
this context, Compromise Programming (CP), introduced by Zeleny (1973) and
Yu (1973), represents a suitable tool to obtain compromise solutions. CP is
based on the concept of ideal point, usually infeasible, given by the optimum
values for the criteria under analysis, and the Zeleny’s axiom of choice (Zeleny,
1973): alternatives that are closer to the ideal are preferred to those that are
further. Finally, a family of distance (loss) functions Lh of parameter h ∈
[1, 2, . . . ,∞] are used to select the best compromise solutions:
Lh =
 n∑
j=1
whj (u
∗
j − uj)h
(1/h) (3)
where u∗j is maximum attainable value for the utility function uj of the j-th
agent. In our context, we use weights wi as an expression of the bargaining power
of agents. By varying parameter h between 1 and∞, we derive the compromise
set. An important advantage of a CP approach to SVE is the possibility to
explore solutions within the range of the maximum aggregated achievement of
criteria (by minimizing Manhattan distances L1) and the maximum balance
balance among criteria (by minimizing Chebyshev distances L∞).
Within economics research, Ballestero and Romero (1991, 1993, 1994) show
that this compromise set can be interpreted as a landing area (a subset of
the Pareto efficient frontier) for utility maximization under plausible restric-
tions. Thus, CP represents a good surrogate of the utility maximum for rational
agents. This argument is corroborated by subsequent works on macroeconomics
(Andre´ et al., 2008; Andre and Cardenete, 2009), microeconomics (Ballestero
and Romero, 1998; Ballestero, 2000; Ballestero and Garcia-Bernabeu, 2015),
and portfolio selection (Ballestero, 1998; Ballestero and Pla-Santamaria, 2004).
In the context of SVE, we rely on CP to study compromise solutions from an
external analyst point of view when social and economic criteria are in conflict,
i.e., when economic and social achievement is out of the “sweet-spot”.
Even though agents in Scenario 1 do not have specific targets for their utility
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functions, our CP setting usually requires that maximum (or anchor) and min-
imum (or nadir) values can be independently established for each of the utility
functions (criteria) used by agents. These values allow to derive normalized
indexes avoiding meaningless comparisons between criteria when utility func-
tions are not homogeneous (different units or scales). In our CP approach to
SVE, agents are able to forecast and compute expectations of their utility func-
tions. Agents are then considered as artificially intelligent agents in the sense
of Marimon et al. (1990). This approach is related to the rational expectations
theory introduced by Muth (1961) and later developed by Sargent and Wallace
(1975, 1976); Lucas and Sargent (1981) and many others. Rational expectations
theory describes economic situations in which outcomes do not systematically
differ from what people expect to happen. The underlying assumption is that
an agent’s rationality is expressed in its behavior to maximize utility. This
paradigm clearly departs from the Simonian bounded rationality which we con-
sider in the Scenario 2.
Scenario 2. SV agents have satisficing targets for their utility functions.
Instead of assuming that economic agents are perfectly rational as in Sce-
nario 1, we can reasonable assume that they face problems with imperfect infor-
mation. The current complexity of the economic environment may make very
difficult the maximization of their goals (Ballestero, 2000). An alternative way
of action is following a satisificing logic in the Simonian sense of bounded ratio-
nality (Simon, 1955, 1979). Bounded rationality suggests a different approach
to rational expectations theory. For an interesting comparison between both
theories see Sent (1997). Satisficing methods aim to find solutions that provide
sufficiently satisfactory levels of goals by means of Goal Programming (GP).
GP is probably the most widely used technique to put into practice this satis-
ficing logic. GP is a multiobjective decision support tool that aims to minimize
the sum of deviations between goal achievement and the aspiration levels (or
targets) of the goals (Charnes and Cooper, 1977; Romero, 1991; Tamiz et al.,
1998; Jones et al., 2010). By minimizing an objective function with the sum of
deviations with respect to the satisfactory aspiration levels bj for each agent, we
say that GP follows a satisfying logic. A weighted GP model can be expressed
as follows:
min
n∑
j=1
[
wj(δ
+
j + δ
−
j )/bj
]
(4)
subject to:
uj = bj + δ
+
j − δ−j j = 1, 2, . . . , n (5)
where uj is the utility function for the j-th agent, and δ
+
j , δ
−
j ≥ 0 are positive
and negative deviations of the j-th utility with respect to its target bj 6= 0. As
in Scenario 1, we follow the approach of using weights wj adding up to one as
an expression of the bargaining power of each agent.
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3 Quantitative foundations of shared value eco-
nomics
Once we have presented our axiomatic approach, we are in a position to develop
SVE by quantitatively defining SV concepts. To this end, we first rely on single
output resource allocations as a common tool in economics (Mas-Colell et al.,
1995).
Definition 3 (Resource allocation). Given an economy with n agents and q
goods, a resource allocation for the j-th agent is a vector yj ∈ Rq that describes
the non-negative quantity xi, with i = 1, . . . , q − 1, of the resources required for
an agent to obtain yq units of a desired output.
yj = (−x1,−x2, . . . ,−xq−1, yq) (6)
Note that the use of some inputs may be zero. An example of a resource
allocation for an industrial company could be (−7,−12,−6, 10), when they use
7 units of raw materials, 12 hours of machinery, and 6 hours of worker-time to
produce 10 units of a final product. For an employee of this company, a resource
allocation could be (0, 0,−1, 1), when she/he dedicates one hour of her/him time
and knowledge to deliver one hour of work to the company.
Porter and Kramer (2011) define value as benefits relative to costs. From
allocation yi, we can straightforwardly derive a measure of value in economic
units from outcomes and resources. Let us consider price vector pj ∈ Rq, where
each element pjk is the price paid by agent j for resource k when k < q, or
obtained for output k when k = q. Price vectors must be different for each
agent since their produced outputs are also different. Then, we can compute
the value vj obtained by agent j as follows:
vj = p
T
j · yj (7)
where T denotes vector transposition. Here, we are interested in multiple allo-
cations for a set of agents (see Axiom 1). A special case of multiple resource
allocations, which we call coalition formation in the context of SVE, is a combi-
nation of n resource allocations (y1, . . . ,yn), for n different agents with n ≥ 2.
Then, the value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ A of n agents can be expressed as
follows:
v(S) =
n∑
j=1
vj(S) (8)
We here interpret the utility derived from coalition S as the value that
agent j can achieve by forming coalition S:
uj(S) := vj(S). (9)
From the set of all possible coalitions, we are interested in the set of feasible
utility outcomes such that no other coalition can improve the payoffs of all its
members. This fact ensures that agents have an incentive to form the coalition,
hence leading to the game-theoretic concept of the core (Shapley, 1971; Mas-
Colell et al., 1995; Leyton-Brown and Shoham, 2008).
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Definition 4 (The core). A payoff vector u ∈ Rn is in the core of a transfer-
able utility coalitional game (A, v), where A denotes the set of agents and v is the
characteristic function, if there is no other coalition S such that uj(S) ≥ uj(A)
for all agents j = 1, . . . , n, and uj(S) > uj(A) for some j. Formally, u is in
the core of game (A, v) if and only if:∑
j∈S
uj ≥ v(S) ∀S ⊆ A (10)
The core requires that the sum of payoffs derived from any subcoalition
must be at least as large as the amount that these agents could share if they
formed a subcoalition. In other words, agents are better off if they are part of
the grand coalition than if the form any subcoalition. From the wide range of
coalitional games, we here focus on cooperative games with a non-empty core
since, by definition, SV agents have an incentive to form the grand coalition
with all agents involved. Then, the core payoff vector u satisfies:∑
j∈A
uj = v(A). (11)
Furthermore, no sub-coalition S has an incentive to break the grand coalition
A since it would result worse-off. Next, we rely on the concept of core to define
shared value games.
Definition 5 (Shared value game). A coalitional game (A, v) is said to be a
shared value game if and only if it is sustainable and it has a non-empty core.
Axiom 1 is implicit in Definition 5 since a non-empty core requires coalition
formation as a basic assumption in game theory. Sustainability is required to
respect Axiom 2 as proposed in Definition 2. Axiom 3 is ensured by both the
internal and external consistency of game theory. The rationale behind the
use of the concept of the core to define a SV game is the fact that all agents
in a shared value game have a strong motivation to cooperate. According to
Definition 5, we are particularly interested in the type of games with a non-
empty core disregarding the fact that, in general, the core is hard to compute.
However, it is shown elsewhere (Shapley, 1971) that every convex game has a
non-empty core.
Definition 6 (Convex game). A coalitional game (A, v) is convex if the fol-
lowing inequality holds:
v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ) ∀S, T ⊂ A. (12)
To illustrate the concept of convexity, let us consider the possible coalition
between the employees, denoted by a1, of a law firm, denoted by a2. The com-
pany have access to a number of customers interested in its services. However,
it has not the knowledge and time required to serve its customers. This time
and knowledge is provided by the firm’s employees that, at the same time,
have no access to the final customers. There are two available options to both
lawyers and the company that are either to cooperate or not to cooperate. As-
sume that if they form a coalition to cooperate the payoffs are, respectively,
u1(A) = 4 and u2(A) = 3. If they do not cooperate the payoffs are zero to
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both agents. As a result, the coalition between the firm and its employees has
value v({a1} ∪ {a2}) = 7, according to equation (8), and there is no incentive
to break the coalition in a convex game since v({a1}) + v({a2}) would be zero
and {a1} ∩ {a2} = ∅.
Even though the existence of a non-empty core is a desirable property it
does not ensure that a SV coalition is in any sense equitable. For example,
the extreme points of a two-dimensional utility frontier z(u1, u2) maximize the
utility of one agent and simultaneously minimize the utility of the other agent
as shown in Figure 3. It is then necessary to look for a compromise solution
according to Axiom 3. Let us assume that women in our law firm example
are paid less than men for the same job and responsibilities. All employees,
represented by agent a1, are interested in maximizing gender equality u1 = E.
For simplicity, we also assume that there are as many women as men in the
company. Then, if Cw is the total amount paid to woman and Cm is the amount
paid to men within a given period, we can express equality as follows:
Cw = E · Cm. (13)
The relationship between gender equality and wages is then quite simple.
When E = 1, woman are paid equal to men. When E < 1 women are paid less
than men. The company, represented by agent a2, is interested in maximizing
benefits u2(S) = B, which we can express as a real valued function of sales
Q ≥ 0 and human resources costs Cw and Cm:
B = Q− Cw − Cm. (14)
By merging Equations (13) and (14), we can express benefits B in terms of
equality E:
B = Q− E · Cm − Cm = Q− Cm(1 + E). (15)
Equation (15) is the utility trade-off z(E,B) in a normalized Equality-
Benefits (E-B) space as shown in Figure 3. Normalization is achieved by means
of two indexes θ1 and θ2 ranging in the interval [0, 1]. Index θ1 = E since the
domain of equality is already [0, 1]. Index θ2 is computed as follows:
θ2 =
B −B∗
B∗ −B∗ (16)
where B∗ = Q− Cm is the maximum benefit obtained when E = 0, and B∗ =
Q− 2Cm is the minimum benefit obtained when E = 1 in Equation (15). Basic
algebra leads to the normalized utility z(E,B) = θ2 = 1− θ1.
The trade-off between benefits and equality is clear. The higher the equal-
ity, the lower the benefits. However, it is likely that an increase in equality will
result in human resources productivity gains, hence improving benefits in the
long-term by reducing costs. Let us assume that there is a training program for
employees that ensures productivity gains. However, women are not willing to
attend the program unless gender inequality is reduced. Then, cooperation (a
coalition) between the law firm and its employees is a good strategy. Let us fur-
ther consider that the coalition formation ensures a cost reduction proportional
to the square of equality so that higher equality achievements can be obtained
for the same desired level of benefits. In order to include productivity gains in
our analysis, we can alternatively express benefits as follows:
B′ = Q− Cm − CmE2 = Q− Cm(1 + E2). (17)
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Figure 3: Creation of shared value.
After normalizing B′ using equation (16), we obtain a new combined util-
ity function z′(E,B) = θ2 = 1 − θ21. We observe in Figure 3 a displacement
of z′(E,B) with respect to z(E,B) towards the ideal equality-benefits combi-
nation, represented by the point (1, 1) in a normalized E-B space. Note also
that the area under curve z′(E,B) is higher than the area under curve z(E,B).
Adapting the recommendations in Salas-Molina et al. (2017) to our context, we
propose the following quantitative definition of shared value creation.
Definition 7 (Shared value creation without targets). Let z(θ1, θ2) be the
combined utility curve in a normalized space θ1−θ2 derived from a shared value
game of two agents without specific targets where θ1 and θ2 are, respectively,
a social and an economic index ranging in [0, 1]. Shared value creation (SVC)
is the increase in the area under the curve (AUC) produced by a displacement
from z(θ1, θ2) to z
′(θ1, θ2). SVC is formally expressed as:
SV C = AUC(z′, θ1, θ2)−AUC(z, θ1, θ2) (18)
where
AUC(z′, θ1, θ2) =
∫ 1
0
z′(θ1, θ2)dθ1 > AUC(z, θ1, θ2) =
∫ 1
0
z(θ1, θ2)dθ1. (19)
This definition also ensures that the best solution for z′(E,B) is a better
solution than the best for z(E,B) in terms of parametric distance Lh. We can
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also generalize Definition 7 to coalitional games of the form (A, v) by considering
the hypervolume of dimension n enclosed under the efficient utility frontier
within an n-dimensional normalized space. In the case of agents of the type
described in Scenario 2, the equivalent general definition of shared value creation
is expressed as follows:
Definition 8 (Shared value creation with targets). Let x ∈ Rm a vector
of feasible decision variables and g(x) ∈ Rn, a general multiobjective function
under a minimization context for a shared value game including social and eco-
nomic goals. SVC with specific targets is the reduction obtained by some function
g′(x) with respect to g(x). SVC is then formally expressed as:
SV C = g(x)− g′(x) (20)
where
g(x) > g′(x). (21)
In the context of bicriteria CP, a perfectly well-balanced solution is given
by the intersection of the efficient frontier with the path θ2 = θ1, which ensures
an equitable combination of achievements as shown in Figure 3. However, in
this particular coalition, we face an interesting paradox. We here describe the
paradox of equality as the fact that perfectly well-balanced solutions do not
result in maximum equality indexes. At most, medium equality indexes are
possible depending on the efficient frontier. Furthermore, equality indexes that
are close to the desirable value of one are only possible when enough bargaining
power produce extremely imbalanced solutions. For instance, if we follow the
approach of expressing bargaining power by means of weights, it can be shown
(see e.g. Ballestero and Romero (1998)) that a well balance solution is given
by:
w1(1− θ1) = w2(1− θ2). (22)
In the example of Figure 3, assume that the relative bargaining power of
employees with respect to the company is expressed by w1 = 0.8 and w2 = 0.2.
This expression implies that employees have four times more power than the law
firm. As a result, the well balanced solution including bargaining power is given
by the intersection of the line θ2 = 4θ1−3, derived from equation (22), with the
efficient frontier. Despite of the imbalance in the bargaining power, best com-
promise solutions are not able to produce maximum equality as the paradox of
equality states. These results are consistent with the trade-off between equality
and efficiency pointed out by Okun (2015).
4 Characterizing economic models
Once we have described SVE from a quantitative point of view, we are in a
position to analyze economic models proposed in the literature according to our
axiomatic approach. As mentioned in the introduction, we here address the
following research question: given an economic model, can we classify it as a
SVE model? Here, we follow the approach of characterizing an economic model
as a SVE model if the axioms introduced in Section 2 are ensured.
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4.1 A portfolio selection model
Let us first consider the classical portfolio selection model proposed by Markowitz
(1952). An investor aims to obtain the best allocation of financial resources
within a set of possible assets. The proposed model looks for solutions that si-
multaneously maximize returns and minimize risk. Since both returns and risk
are objectives in conflict, there is a need to find a compromise solution. Let us
further consider that a hypothetical investor is willing to include in the selection
process social criteria as described in Ballestero et al. (2012). One may reason-
ably ask if this socially responsible investment model can be labelled as SVE.
According to Axiom 1, the answer is no. Even though this model could per-
fectly fit under the sustainability and consistency axioms, the presence of only
one agent, the investor, determines the characterization as a non-SVE model
since the feature of coalition formation is not present in the model. A different
characterization could take place if the managers of a socially responsible fund
(Ballestero et al., 2012, 2015) include in the model the particular preferences of
the buyers of the fund.
In the context of mutual funds, we can further consider the model pro-
posed by Ballestero and Pla-Santamaria (2004). Individual investors (ai : i =
1, 2 . . . , n) behave as customers buying the services of the fund rather than
as decision-makers. The managers of the fund (m) aim to differentiate from
their competitors by offering thematic portfolios as a marketing strategy. Pref-
erences of individual investors for profitability and risk are elicited by means
of a questionnaire. The existence of this questionnaire is the way in which
the coalition formation of Axiom 1 between individual investors and the fund
takes place. Assume also that sustainability in Axiom 2 is guaranteed by the
presence of portfolios characterized by socially responsible assets. Finally, con-
sistency in Axiom 3 is ensured by the CP method based described in Ballestero
and Pla-Santamaria (2004) that outputs a portfolio ranking derived from the
questionnaire and the percentage of individual investors interested in different
sets of thematic portfolios. The existence of a non-empty core is guaranteed by
the following reasoning.
Proposition 1 Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an,m} be a set formed by n individual
fund investors ai : i = 1, 2 . . . , n, and a fund manager m. The game (A, v) is
a shared value game if v is a function of the social and economic preferences of
both investors and fund manager.
Proof 1 Assume that A is formed by subset S = {a1, a2, . . . , an} and subset
T = {m}. Investors in S declare their collective social and economic preferences
to the fund manager in T by means of a questionnaire. The value of coalition
S∪T is the sum of the utility for both subsets of agents: v(S∪T ) = u(S)+u(T ).
Utility u(S) for investors derived from buying the fund is assumed to be at lest
as good as any other fund from a socially responsible investment point of view:
u(S) ≥ v(S). It is also reasonable to accept that utility u(T ) for the fund
manager is greater than value v(T ) = 0 derived from breaking coalition S ∪ T .
Sustainability is guaranteed by function v, which includes social and economic
preferences. Inequality v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ) holds and the core is
non-empty. As a result, we are dealing with a shared value game as proposed in
Definition 5.
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4.2 A carpooling model
Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2018) have recently proposed a carpooling model to
achieve socially efficient outcomes in a transportation marketplace with au-
tonomous driving services. The main advantage of considering an economy in
which all cars are self-driving is that carpooling with self-driving is a one-sided
matching problem, while with regular cars it is a two-sided one, hence reducing
its complexity. The model considers a finite set of riders m = 1, 2, . . . ,M inter-
ested in collaborating to build trips, defined as feasible combinations of one or
more riders over a finite set of road segments.
Each rider has a non-negative valuation vm(t) for every trip t. Riders want
to maximize the difference between value vm(t) and price pm paid for the trip.
By assuming that all riders act a single agent for simplicity, the global utility
for the entire set of riders is expressed as follows:
U =
M∑
m=1
Um(tm, pm) =
M∑
m=1
(vm(tm)− pm). (23)
A regulator owning road segments imposes the payment of reduced fees for
tolls for each segment of the trip in which riders are involved. The presence of
tolls acts as an incentive for riders, since it allows them to share the costs of
those tolls. In addition, an assignment A is a set of trips such that each rider is
involved in exactly one trip t ∈ A with an associated cost c(t). This assignment
requires the fulfillment of the budget-balance condition stating that the sum of
prices paid by the riders for their trips is greater than or equal to the sum of
total physical costs of those trips for the riders and the total tolls on the road
segments involved in those trips. Finally, the regulator plays the role of a social
planner interested in maximizing a real valued social surplus P defined as:
P =
M∑
m=1
vm(tm)−
∑
t∈A
c(t) (24)
Summarizing, this carpooling model requires a coalition formation between
riders, aiming at maximizing their transportation utility in equation (23), and
a regulator, aiming at maximizing the social surplus described in equation (24).
The presence of many agents, namely, riders and the regulator, respects Axiom
1. Since the regulator aims to maximize the social surplus of an assignment and
riders want to maximize their utility, both the sustainability and consistency
of Axioms 2 and 3 represent key elements of the model. Is the core of this
carpooling model non-empty? To answer this question, we rely on the following
proposition.
Proposition 2 Let A = {a1, a2, . . . , aM , r} be a set formed by M riders ai :
i = 1, 2 . . . ,M , and a regulator r. The game (A, v) is a shared value game if v
includes the social and economic needs of riders and regulator.
Proof 2 Assume that set A is formed by subset S = {a1, a2, . . . , aM} and a
subset T = {r}. Without the regulator, roads and reduced prices would not
be possible resulting in v(S) ≤ U . Without riders, social surplus P = v(T )
would be zero, hence preventing sustainibility. As a result, inequality U + P ≥
v(S) + v(T )− v(S ∩ T ) holds and the core is non-empty. Then, this model is a
shared value game according to Definition 5.
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Thus, we conclude that the carpooling model presented by Ostrovsky and
Schwarz (2018) is a is a SVE model. Note, however, that both utility U and
social surplus P include the sum of riders’ valuations. There is no trade-off
between goals. The higher the utility, the higher the social surplus. Both agents
have an incentive for cooperation, and we are dealing with the so-called “sweet-
spot” (Dembek et al., 2016). To illustrate the common conflict between the
objectives of economic agents, consider now that the regulator issues a license
to a company that is interested in maximizing revenues R:
R =
M∑
m=1
pm. (25)
In this new context, SVE axioms hold too, but there is a trade-off between
revenues and riders utility that can be computed by adding equations (23)
and (25):
R =
M∑
m=1
vm(tm)− U. (26)
Due to this trade-off, it is necessary to look for a compromise solution.
To this end, we first normalize utility and revenues, respectively, by means of
indexes θ1 and θ2 following the same procedure that we use in equation (16).
Then, we can depict normalized revenues θ2 in terms of utility θ1 as shown
in Figure 4. The line θ2 = 1 − θ1 represents the current (the actual-world)
situation in which the revenues of the licensee are inversely proportional to the
riders’ utility.
Figure 4: Creation of shared value in carpooling.
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However, let us consider that the licensee is able to differentiate its carpooling
service in such a way that riders’ utility increases for the same price. This fact
can be caused by a better matching algorithm, lower waiting times, better cars,
or many other reasons. Let us further assume that the trade-off between utility
and revenues shifts from θ2 = 1 − θ1 to θ2 = 1 − θ31 due to a better quality
carpooling service. Each of the points of curve θ2 = 1− θ31 is a better solution
than any of the points in the previous situation described by θ2 = 1− θ1. This
displacement represents shared value creation as proposed in this paper. An
additional interesting feature of our approach is that the opportunity of shared
value creation can be estimated as the area comprised between these two curves.
5 Conclusions
The notion of shared value raised doubts mainly about conceptualization, its
beneficiaries and the way it is transformed into practical policies in modern
economics. By means of an axiomatic approach, we show that shared value
can be formally characterized as a first step to develop the concept and facili-
tate further research. By considering both the pioneering definition of shared
value by Porter and Kramer and its criticisms, we propose a novel economic
framework based on three axioms: coalition formation, sustainability and con-
sistency. The presence of multiple agents that create value motivates the axiom
of coalition formation to highlight the aspect that shared valued derives from a
group formed by two or more agents. The axiom of sustainability ensures that
both economic and social aspects are involved in shared value as its definition
states. Finally, the axiom of consistency is a third key aspect to account for not
only the theoretical principles of shared value but also for its practical imple-
mentation. In this sense, multiple criteria decision making methods represent a
suitable approach to deal with shared value economics.
From the the axioms of coalition formation, sustainability and consistency,
we derive the quantitative foundations of the theory of shared value. As a second
result, we define shared value economics from a quantitative perspective as the
coalition formation between multiple agents that make the best decisions under
a long-term perspective of sustainability. Furthermore, we use utility functions
to measure the outcomes of shared value and the game-theoretic concept of the
core to formally define a shared value game and shared value creation. In or-
der to obtain shared value policies in practice, multiple criteria decision making
techniques provide a way to handle conflicting agents’ goals as a surrogate for
classical utility maximization approaches. A further advantage of considering
multiple criteria decision making tools to deal with shared value economic prob-
lems is its ability to incorporate the concept of bounded rationality to cover a
wider range of shared value agents.
Summarizing, our proposal contributes to consolidate the concept of shared
value within modern economic theory. Our axiomatic approach builds on the
foundations of shared value to improve its understanding and to facilitate formal
reasoning and the suggestion of economic hypothesis. One of these hypotheses is
the verification if an economic model can be classified as shared value economic
model or not. As an illustration of such a formal reasoning, we show how a
portfolio selection model and a carpooling model can be characterized by means
of logical deductions. In this sense, determining how economic models can be
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adapted to fit the axioms of shared value economics is an interesting future line
of work.
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